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Abstract 
Traditional economic theory, up to the middle of the twentieth century, builds up the 
production functions regardless the inputs’ scarcity. In the last few decades has been 
clear that both the inputs are depletable quantities and a lot of constraints are imposed 
in their usage in order to ensure economic sustainability. Furthermore, the management 
of exploitation and use of natural resources (either exhaustible or renewable) has been 
discussed by analyzing dynamic models applying methods of Optimal Control Theory. 
This theory provides solutions that are concerned with a single decision maker who can 
control the model dynamics facing a certain performance index to be optimized. In fact, 
market structures or exploitation patterns are often oligopolistic, i.e. there are several 
decision makers whose policies influence each other. So, game theoretical approaches 
are introduced into the discussion. According to the theory of continuous time models 
of Optimal Control, the appropriate analogue of differential games is used. Roughly, 
this is the extension of Optimal Control, when there is exactly one decision maker, to 
the case of ( )2N N ≥  decision makers interacting with each other. 
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1.       Introduction 
In the literature of environmental economics, existing models often make an 
assumption in which the involved agents exploit the resource from a common pool area in a 
non-cooperative way. This approach yields inefficiency in the well known sense   “tragedy 
of commons” (Benchekroun, 2003). Tragedy of commons refers to a situation in which a 
producible asset is exploited jointly by several economic agents whose “non-cooperative” 
behavior results in overexploitation of the asset, i.e., an exploitation of the asset that is not 
jointly efficient (Pareto optimal).  
In fact, market structures of exploitation patterns are often oligopolistic, i.e., there 
are several decision makers whose policies influence each other. So, game theoretical 
approaches are introduced into the discussion. According to the theory of continuous time 
models of Optimal Control, the appropriate analogue of differential games is used. Roughly, 
this is an extension of Optimal Control, when there is an exactly one decision maker, to the 
case of  N  (N>1) decision makers interacting with each other. 
Dynamic models of  exploitation (or harvesting) and use of natural resources refer to 
two different systems of property rights: In the case of sole ownership, optimal extraction 
policies can be obtained by means of Optimal Control Theory (Clark, 1976); in the case of 
open access or common property exploitation, game theoretical models are applicable in the 
sense that all decision makers exploit a resource from a common pool without any 
restriction, looking only at their own profits over some time horizon, and without 
considering the stock of the resource, which is diminished due to the extraction policies of 
all the players of the game who share the common pool (Clark, 1980; Dockner et al., 1989). 
Environmental problems can be understood as the exploitation of a common pool of 
a natural resource by several players. For example, activities with polluting results have 
cumulative future consequences. Activities of some nations may affect the interests of other 
nations, that is a kind of players’ interdependence. Sulphur emissions lead to acid rain, 
which does not respect borders, or pollution of the sea caused by industrial activities in areas 
located far away but connected with the sea by a river which transports the waste industrial 
residuals. This pollution may have impacts on other economic sectors of the same nation or 
of borders. 
Whenever decision makers are few, one cannot use models of perfect competition, 
but the appropriate framework for the discussion of these problems is given by theoretical 
approaches with special regard to the question of “how to play the game”: cooperatively or 
non–cooperatively?. Moreover if we assume that there is a regulator managing 
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environmental and natural resources problems, caused by natural resource extraction, it is 
impossible in our opinion to settle the problem because is difficult to find which is the 
polluter in order to compensate the pollutee for the damage incurred, from the Pigouvian 
point of view.  
In natural resources economics there is a chain of externalities arisen by human 
activities, known as environmental externalities. Once a natural resource is explored and is 
ready for exploitation the first externality arises from the fact that the extraction cost raises 
not only with the current exploitation rate, but with the cumulative amount extracted to date. 
Consequently, a unit of resource extracted today will inflict an intertemporal externality in 
the form of pushing up extraction costs at all future dates, assuming a twice continuously 
differentiable cost function. The cost function, along the extraction path, must be an 
increasing function not only with respect to the extraction rate but also it must be an 
increasing function of the remainder stock. In such a way it is possible to assume that the 
marginal current exploitation cost is higher both at higher exploitation rate and, for a 
constant rate of exploitation, at higher depletion rates. 
The second externality is in association with the use of the extracted resource. The 
resource use not only damages the environment through the current flow of an externality, 
but also damages the environment indirectly by adding to the accumulated stock of an 
externality and pushing it toward to a critical level. A well known example is the 
externalities associated with fossil fuel use when the flow externality may take one of the 
forms of air pollution, pollution of the seas by oil spills, land pollution caused by dumping 
of coal wastes, while the stock externality takes the form of greenhouse warming and acid 
rain. 
From the supply side point of view, resource-extracting oligopolists continually 
engage in the search for additional stocks or in finding new technologies to transform re-
sources that are economically non-exploitable into resources that can be profitably 
extracted. If the demand curve facing the industry is elastic, the discovery of additional 
stocks will raise the industry’s profit. It is not clear, however, if all firms will benefit 
from a windfall “gain” (discovery) that increases the stock of each firm. 
When a given number of firms deplete an exhaustible resource with zero 
extraction costs and iso–elastic demand, it has been argued that the oligopoly and cartel 
outcomes are efficient and that firms deplete according to the Hotelling’s rule (Dasgupta 
and Heal, 1979). This implies that dynamic oligopolies and cartels cannot be 
distinguished from perfect competition and that firms act as if there are well defined 
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private property rights. These results are somewhat counter intuitive and cannot explain 
the phenomena of ‘wild – cutting’. One reason for excessive extraction rates in 
oligopolistic resource markets may be that firms are worried that, if they announce to 
extract efficiently, one of their rivals with access to current stock levels will have an 
incentive to deplete more rapidly, therefore yielding inefficiency. 
In this paper, we consider oligopolistic equilibrium in subgame-perfect strategies in 
continuous time, and investigate the effect of stock discovery on the profits of non-
identical oligopolists. We show that a uniform addition to all stocks could harm firms 
that are originally larger than average. 
In a static model, this result is not surprising. Starting from a Cournot 
equilibrium it is well known that a marginal reduction of all firms’ production will be 
beneficial to the firms and will move them closer to the cooperative equilibrium. 
Conversely, increasing the output of all firms is likely to move them further from the 
cooperative outcome and will reduce their profits. In a dynamic framework with free time 
horizon, this reasoning is not necessarily valid. The typical extraction path under non-
cooperation is monotonically decreasing over time with production level below the 
production level of cooperative exploitation for at least some interval of time, which we 
refer to as a scarcity phase. When a firm receives an additional stock it splits its extra-
exploitation between the scarcity phase and the phase where production is above the 
cooperative level. Increasing exploitation during the phase where production is above the 
cooperative level decreases instantaneous profits but increasing exploitation in the former 
phase increases instantaneous profits, resulting in an unclear conclusion for the overall 
impact in firms profits. 
Existing models of natural resource oligopoly that use the concept of Markov 
perfect Nash equilibria are typically based on the assumption that there is only one stock, to 
which all firms have equal common access (see for instance Benchekroun, 2003; 
Benchekroun and Long, 2002; Dockner and Sorger, 1996; Benhabib and Radner, 1992). 
Our model has N stocks, and we rule out common access.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of 
resource extraction with an isoelastic demand function. Section 3 provides the Markov 
perfect Nash equilibrium strategies that are time consistent and the resulting value 
function for the strategies. Section 4 proposes some policy instruments based on changes 
(marginal of uniform) of the allowed resource stock, while section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. The basic model 
Let us assume that there are N  firms in an oligopoly market. Firm i  is endowed 
with a stock of a resource ( )iS t  at time t , with ( ) 00i iS S= . Let ( )S t  denote the sum of 
all stocks at time t , that is 
                                                ( ) ( )
1
N
i
i
S t S t
=
=∑  
We define ( ) ( ) ( )i iS t S t S t− = − . We then also assume that the rate of change of firm’s i  
resource stock is[1]  
                                                 
( ) ( ) ( )i i idS t S t h tdt
•= =−  
where ( )ih t  is firm’s i  extraction rate at time t . The inverse demand function is given 
by  
                                      ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )f a tD h t h t=  
with ( )( ) ( )f a t a t=− , ( ) ( ]0,1a t ∈  ( )0,t∀ ∈ +∞  and ( ) ( )
1
N
i
i
h t h t
=
=∑  denotes the 
overall extracted quantity. 
The function ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1f a t a t−⎡ ⎤ = ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  determines, in absolute value, the instantaneous 
elasticity of demand, i.e. the inverse demand function is always elastic and takes the 
hyperbolic shape if ( ) 1a t =  (i.e. a constant), but is always convex. 
Here in order to form the dynamic problem we assume utility derived from 
revenues, so firms in industry are rather revenues maximizers. Moreover we assume 
that the resource stock is not restrictive for the firms’ decisions (i.e. extraction rate) but 
the regulator is the decision maker of the state variable, i.e. the remainder resource 
                                                 
[1] A similar adoption in the resource reduction equation is made by Batabyal (1995a, 1995b)  
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stock as you will see below. One of the results[2] of the paper is that the control 
trajectory is strictly dependent on the extraction trajectory and on instantaneous 
elasticity as well. So, the state variable as affected from the control, the problem is an 
optimal control for every involved firm. 
Having these assumptions the dynamic formulation can be presented as follows.  
Firm’s i  revenues are given by the expression: 
                                    ( ) ( ) ( )( ), f a ti i i i i iR h h h h h− −= +         
where                                    i ih h h− = −  
The objective function of firm i  is to maximize the present value of the stream of cash 
flow subject to the system dynamics, that is the problem[3] 
                                     ( ) ( )( )
0
max f a t ti i ih h h e dt
ρ
∞
−
−+∫                           ( )1  
subject to                             ( ) ( )i iS t h t• = −                                                 ( )1a  
with                                        ( ) 00i iS S=         
The control variable of firm i  is its quantity ih , while the state variable is its remainder 
resource iS . 
We seek to find a strategy and the value function of the dynamic problem under the 
Closed Loop[4] or Markovian Nash informational structure equilibrium which is by 
definition the concept of equilibrium in which the choice of player’s i  current action is 
conditioned on current time t  and on state vector too.  
                                                 
[2] In another perspective a second result could be the fact that a tightening of the regulation on total 
allowent resource stock can lead to an increase in firms’ NPV of discounted revenues. 
[3] In this setting i.e. the state variable doesn’t enter into objective function, the induced game seems to be 
a trivial one. 
[4] For more details about the informational structures of the dynamics games, see Olsder and Basar 
(1998). 
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Under the closed–loop informational structure and stationarity of the game the 
player’s i  strategy space[5] is this of mappings 
                                               : niφ + →\ \  
which associates to a vector of resource stock ( )1 2, ,..., nNS S S R+∈   the quantity 
( )1 2, ,...,i NS S Sφ  to extract. Each player i  of the game has to choose a quantity 
( )ih t R∈  of the resource, and the price of that resource is then set according to  
                                      ( ) ( )
( )( )
1 2
1
, ,...,
f a tN
N i
i
D h h h h t
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
The utility (total revenues) enjoyed by firm i  is then given by 
             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2
0
: , ,..., , ,..., ,..., ti N i NU D S S S S e dt
ρφ φ φ φ φ φ φ
∞
−→ ∫  
where ( ) 1,...,k k NS =  evolve according to the differential equation determined by ( )1a . 
Equilibrium should then be defined as a set of strategies for which no player has a 
profitable deviation. 
Imposing this assumption on informational structure of the game, clearly the history 
of the game is important and is reflected in the current value of the state vector. 
Consequently, player’s i  optimal time paths take into account at any point of time the 
control variables (quantity extracted) of the other players. This type of equilibrium 
affects the state variables, requiring a revision of the player’s i  controls at any time 
instant. Here we apply the Hamilton – Jacobi – Bellman (HJB) equation in order to 
prove that the conjectured strategy we propose is a Markovian strategy and 
                                                 
[5] By strategy spaces, we mean the information available to each player together with a set of functions 
with this information as domain. These functions are actually the permissible ways in which the players 
are allowed to use that information. Open loop strategies, where at each instant of time t the players have 
knowledge of the present time instant t and the initial condition S(0) of the state, result in different 
equilibrium from the strategies where at each instant of time t the players have knowledge of  the time t, 
the initial state S(0) and the current state S(t). 
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consequently a strongly time consistent one. In contrast to the open loop informational 
structure the closed loop is a strongly time consistent one, but the open loop is not. 
Here the time consistent property is in the sense of sub–game perfectness (for more 
details see Dockner et al. 2000). 
3. Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) 
We denote by iφ  the strategy that specifies firm’s i  extraction rate as a function of 
time t  and the vector of remainder resource stock at the same time. This is the strategy 
                    ( ) ( )( )i ih t S tφ=  
Each firm takes competitors strategies as given and determines its optimal strategy that 
solves problem ( )1  with constraint ( )1a . 
Proposition 1. 
A MPNE exists, where the equilibrium strategy of firm i  has the property that its 
extraction level depends on its own resource stock and on elasticity of demand. That is                           
( ) ( ) ( )i ih t S ta t
ρ=                        1,...,i N=  
The discounted sum of firm’s i  revenues ( )iV S , when the total resource stock is S , are 
given by                       ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
a t
i
i a t
a t S t
V S
Sρ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠                   ( )2  
Proof (is given in the appendix) 
Given the discounted revenues expression by ( )2 , we are able to see the impact from a 
change in elasticity of demand in the discounted revenues. Therefore we take the 
derivative of the value function expression given by ( )2  with respect to the demand 
curvature a , assuming that the initial resource stock of firm’s i  and the overall 
resource stock S  remains unchanged, that is  
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                          ( )ln 1 1 ln
a
i
i i
dV S S SS V S
da a a a
ρ ρ ρ− ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎜= − + = −⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠   
which is a negative or positive quantity, meaning that the discounted revenues change 
will be negative or positive, depending on the sign of the quantity 1 ln S
a
ρ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ . 
3.1. The unary elasticity demand (A special case) 
Consider for a moment that elasticity of demand equals to one independent of 
time, ( ) 1a t = . As it is simply clear in this case the market demand function collapses 
to a hyperbolic shape, this being a special case of a more general class of models based 
on isoelastic demand curves. An isoelastic demand function was used to study the 
stability for a general Cournot oligopoly (Chiarella and Szidarovsky, 2002) and in 
many variations (Puu, 1991, 1996; Puu and Norin 2003; Puu and Marin, 2006). 
Furthermore isoelastic demand functions is a result in the case the consumers maximize 
utility functions of the Cobb – Douglas type in a static environment. The static problem 
for the i consumer is ( ) ( )1 21 2max ...i ia ai iD D  , subject to the budget constraint   
1 1 2 2 ...
i i iy p D p D= + +  with kp  to denote the prices of the commodities and ikD  denote 
the quantities demanded. The well known outcome of this static constrained 
maximization is i i ik k kp D a y= whence ika  is the fixed spending share of the i’s consumer 
income iy  on the k-th good.  
From the above problem solution the resulting demand for each consumer is 
reciprocal to price charged that is 
i i
i k
k
k
a yD
p
= , so dropping commodities indices, 
aggregate demand obtained (the sum of all  consumers) as 
i i
i i
i
a y RD D
p p
= = =∑∑ .    
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Puu (2008) also uses the following price specification 
1
N
i
i
Rp
q
=
=
∑
 where p  denotes 
market price, 
1
N
i
i
q
=
∑  is the total quantity produced, while R  is the sum of the total 
budget shares that all consumers spend in the particular good.    It is well known from 
the literature[6] in such a case the maximum problem of a firm choosing the output level 
is indeterminate if marginal cost is zero, since the revenues generated by a hyperbolic 
demand are constant, thus economically unacceptable. But even in this special case our 
model under closed loop informational structure yields linear strategies and value 
function as well. More precise setting demand elasticity to one, 1a = , the model 
solution yields the following results for strategies and value function respectively: 
             i ih Sρ=                      1,...,i N=                  ( )3  
                             ( ) ii SV S Sρ=                  ( )4  
 The latter reasoning leads us to conclude the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1 
The above proposed model of an exhaustible resource extraction even in the special 
case of isoelastic demand, so for constant consumers’ budget share, yields 
deterministic Markovian linear strategies and value functions given by ( )3 , ( )4  
respectively. 
                                                 
[6] For an exposition of a differential oligopoly model where firms face implicit menu costs of adjusting 
output over time due to sticky market price, see Lambertini (2007). 
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4. Regulating policies in the allowed resource stock  
We consider now the impact of a marginal change in the allowed resource stock 
imposed by an authority into the firms’ value function. For this purpose we investigate 
the total differentiation of the value function  
( ) ( )
a
i
i a
S taV S
Sρ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
with respect to the remainder resource, that is  
                         
, 1
N
i i
i i j
j i ji j
V VdV dS dS
S S≠ =
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂∑          ( )5  
In order to have a unified result into the previous found value function of each firm we 
record the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. 
A marginal increase in the total resource stock, affects incrementally the discounted 
firm’s i  revenues, if the inequality i idS Sa
dS S
>  holds, otherwise an increase in the total 
resource stock reduces the discounted sum of firm’s i  revenues. 
Proof (See Appendix) 
In proposition 2 the elasticity of demand plays a crucial role. Inequality in 
proposition 2 implies that if the marginal changes in resource shares are greater than the 
marginal resource shares multiplied by the inverse elasticity then every firm has 
incremental revenues. Assuming for a moment that a firm decides to extract a more 
inelastic resource with 1a a>  and with the same resource stock iS . Clearly the 
extraction rate of the more inelastic resource will be higher as the Markov strategy in 
proposition 1 reveals. But it is not clear that the raised revenues requirement  
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i idS Sa
dS S
>  maintains the same inequality. So the firm decides at the margin which 
elasticity prefers to supply.  
The total derivative of the value function after manipulations (see in the appendix) 
is given by the expression  
                      
a
i i
i
dS SdV S dS a
a aS S
ρ − ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜= − ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠                    ( )6  
Since the term 
a
S
a
ρ −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  of  ( )6  always measures the aggregate demand, as 
1 1
a aN N
i i
i i
h h S S
a a
ρ ρ− −
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  and we have set 1
N
i
i
S S
=
=∑ , the rest of term ( )6  
i idS SdS a
dS S
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  measures the amount multiplied with the total demand, giving the total 
marginal change on the discounted revenues.  
Furthermore, we assume that the sign of  the expression ( )6  is positive, the latter 
assumption implies an increment of  the discounted revenues, that is, i idS Sa
dS S
>   and 
firms are ranked by an increasing order of the allowed resource 
stock, 1 2 1... ...i i NS S S S S+< < < < < < , so the initial resource shares are 1i iS SS S
+< . We 
have                           11,i ii i
S SdS adS dS adS
S S
+
+> >   
Subtracting the LHS and RHS of the two relations we have 
             ( )1 1i i i idSdS dS a S SS+ +− > −                         ( )7  
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The LHS of  ( )7  is a small negative number. For a perfectly elastic demand ( )0a ≈  
the LHS of ( )7  tends to zero, so we have  1i idS dS +>  ( )i∀ . According to  ( )7  we 
conclude the following corollary. 
Corollary 2 
In the case of a large number of substitutes an increment in the discounted revenues 
caused by a marginal increment of the total allowed resource stock, dS , the order of 
marginal increments of individual firms, idS , is ranked by the reverse order rather than 
the originally allowed set of resource stocks. That is, if 1 2 ... NS S S< < <  the result in 
the above marginal increase is 1 2 ... NdS dS dS> > >  
The impact of an absolute increase to the pollution stocks  idS ε=  ( )i∀  can be 
expressed as follows. 
Corollary 3 
A uniform absolute increase in all resource stocks by 0idS ε= > reduces firm’s i  
discounted revenues if and only if  1iS
S aN
> . 
Proof 
The result is easily obtained since 
1
1N i
i
i
dSdS dS N
dS N
ε
=
= = ⇒ =∑  and i iS dSa S dS< . 
Next we consider a new allocation of the allowed stocks. With OiS  we denote firm’s 
i  old allowed stock and with NiS  the reallocated (new) allowed resource stock. 
Moreover we assume that the new allowed pollution is less than the 
original, ( )1,..,O Ni iS S i N> = . 
The next proposition joins the two pollution stocks assuming the last given order.  
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Proposition 3. 
The discounted revenues of each firm increases while the total resource stock falls, 
caused by a new allocation, if and only if ( )1 1aiσ σ> − + , where 
1
1
1
N
N
k
k
N
O
k
k
S
S
σ =
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= −⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
 and 1
N
i
i O
i
S
S
σ = − . 
 
Proof (See Appendix) 
Remark 
The results of Proposition 3 may be used as follows. Suppose that an authority 
decides to decrease the total resource stock by an amount SΔ  
1
N
i
i
S
S
σ
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ Δ ⎟⎜ ⎟=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∑
, so in order 
to have each firm higher revenues, its allowed resource stock must be reduced by the 
amount  ( )( )1 1aO N Oi i i iS S S Sσ− =Δ = − + . 
In the same way we consider a uniform decrease η  to all firms’ resource stock. 
Then                           1
1 1
1
N
O
i
i
N N
O O
i i
i i
N S
N
S S
η ησ =
= =
+
= − =
∑
∑ ∑
 
and the raised revenues requirement is       ( )1 1 aiσ σ −> − −  
and finally                                              ( )
1
1 1 aiN
O
i
i
N
S
η σ −
=
> − −
∑
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where 
1
N
O O
i
i
S S
=
=∑  is the initial allocation of the pollution and 1 Nii O
i
S
S
σ = −  the 
percentage change on firm’s i  allowed resource stock. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we set up a very simple model of extracting oligopolists where the 
demand is not linear and the resulting game is not a linear quadratic one. We also make 
the assumption that each firm is allowed to extract to a variable size depending on the 
criterion that is given by an authority. The results, in our opinion, are useful for a policy 
maker to make distributed extraction policies on the industry in total as well as partially 
on a firm.   
One conclusion that could be drawn as a result of the above model is that a new 
technology that reduces the total amount of the extraction stock is not necessarily 
welcomed by all firms in the industry. If for example any authority decides to improve 
the technology that is used by firms previous analysis shows that the bigger, with 
respect to the allowed resource stock, firm does not always benefit from this decision. 
Specifically, our results on a strong time consistent (Markov) equilibrium with 
conjectured value function and strategies are surprising. Although without exposing the 
solutions of the problem in full generality, as Tsutsui and Mino (1990) face their linear 
quadratic differential game in a duopoly with sticky prices, a strong time consistent 
solution is obtained using the conjectured method.   
Moreover testing the above strategies and the value function obtained we are able to 
conclude some interesting policy implications. In general, we expect that for each firm 
the higher the extraction rates is the more the utility (discounted revenues) will be. 
However, the findings of the model are slightly different. It is possible a marginal 
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decrease on the total extraction stock to increase the firms’ discounted revenues, 
provided that the original allowed share multiplied by the elasticity of demand is 
greater than the marginal change share.  
Additionally, a reallocation caused by a uniform decrease into all firms resources, 
reorders the marginal change of the stocks in reverse to the original order of the 
allowed stocks and again the reallocation is possible to raise the discounted revenues of 
each firm.  
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       Appendix   
Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First we check that if firm’s j  strategy is j jh Sa
ρ= , then firm’s i  best response will be 
i ih Sa
ρ= . The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (hereafter HJB) equation for firm’s i  
maximization problem  is the following 
                   ( )
, 1
a N
i i
i i i i i j
j i ji j
V VV h h S h S
a S S a
ρ ρρ
−
−
≠ =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜= + + − + −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∂ ∂∑  
Maximization of the RHS of the HJB equation with respect to ih  gives  
                    0
a
a i i i
i
i i
i
i i
h h S
Vah S a
a Sh S
a
ρ
ρ
ρ
−
− −
−
−
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎛ ⎞ ∂⎝ ⎠⎟⎜ + − − =⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠ ∂⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 
or equivalently 
                   1
a
i i
i i
i
i i
V hh S a
S a h S
a
ρ
ρ
−
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞ ⎢ ⎥∂ ⎟⎜= + −⎢ ⎥⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠∂ ⎟⎜ +⎢ ⎥⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
      ( ).1A  
Where iS−  represents the sum of all resource stocks except firm’s i  stock, that is  
i iS S S− = −  and 
1
N
j
j
S S
=
= ∑  
Now we make use the nonlinear conjectured value function  
                                
1
aa N
i i j
j
aV S Sρ
−
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎜⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑  
Differentiation of the value function with respect to iS  yields 
                 1
a
i i
i
V SS a
S a S
ρ − ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜= − ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∂          ( ).2A  
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with 
1
N
j
j
S S
=
=∑  the same as above. 
Equating the terms with the same power of  ( ).1A  and ( ).2A  we have the 
resulting system of equations. 
                           1 1i i
i i
h Sa a
Sh S
a
ρ
−
− = −⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ + ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
      ( ).3A  
and                                   i ih S Sa a
ρ ρ
−+ =            ( ).4A  
Both equations ( ).3A   and ( ).4A  have the same solution         i ih Sa
ρ= . 
Now we prove that substituting the above strategies into the RHS of the HJB function 
we have equality with the LHS of the same equation. The partial derivative of the value 
function iV  with respect to jS  is 
                                 ( )1 0
a
ai
i
j
V aa S S
S ρ
− +⎛ ⎞∂ ⎟⎜=− ⎟ <⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠             ( ).5A  
so the RHS of the HJB becomes 
( )
( )
1
, 1
RHS(HJB) 1
1 1 LHS(HJB)
aa a N
ai
i i i j
j i j
a a
i i
i i i
S aS S S a S a S S S
a a a S a a
S SS S a a S S V S
a a S S a
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ
ρ ρ ρρ ρ
− −
− +
≠ =
− −
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎜ ⎜= − − + − ⎟ − =⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜⎜⎜ ⎜ ⎜⎟⎟⎟ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟⎟ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎜= − + + = = =⎟⎟ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎜⎟⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑
 
Where as above we have set 
1
N
j
j
S S
=
= ∑  and 
1,
N
i j
j j i
S S−
= ≠
= ∑  
Proof of Proposition 2 
The total derivative of the value function for the moment t  is  
                          
, 1
N
i i
i i j
j i ji j
V VdV dS dS
S S≠ =
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂∑             ( ).6A  
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1
a
i i
i
V SS a
S a S
ρ − ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜= − ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∂ ( ).2A ( )1 0
a
ai
i
j
V aa S S
S ρ
− +⎛ ⎞∂ ⎟⎜=− ⎟ <⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠ ( ).5A  
Substituting the partial derivatives ( ).2A  and ( ).5A  previously found, into ( ).6A  the 
derivative of the value function takes the form: 
               ( )1
, 1
1
a aN
ai
i i j j
j i j
SdV S a dS a S S dS
a S a
ρ ρ− − − +
≠ =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟⎟ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎜= − + −⎟⎟ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎜⎟⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ∑  
Putting the term 
a
i
i
SS a dS
a S
ρ −⎛ ⎞⎟⎜− ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠   inside the sum, the above expression simplifies to 
                  ( )1
1
a aN
a
i i j j
j
dV S dS a S S dS
a a
ρ ρ− − − +
=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜= + −⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑  
Multiplying  and divide the first term the RHS of the latter by 
1
1a N
i j
j
a S S dS
a S
ρ −
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ∑  
we have              
1
1
a N
ji
i j N
j
j
j
SdSdV S dS a
a SdS
ρ −
=
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎜⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎜⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= − ⎟⎜⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑
 
Setting 
1
N
j
j
dS dS
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟≡⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠∑  the latter simplifies to  
a
i i
i
dS SdV S dS a
a dS S
ρ − ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜= − ⎟⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠     ( ).7A  
The meaning of  ( ).7A  is, as we expect that a change in the allowed resource stocks 
results in the same sign change on firm’s i  discounted revenues depending on the sign 
of the term inside the brackets. That is, if the sign of the bracketed term is positive an 
increase in the total resource stock dS  increases the discounted revenues of firm’s i , as 
the term outside brackets reveals and vice versa.  
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Now consider the term of ( ).7A  i idS Sa
dS S
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠ , which shows how the change on 
firm’s i  revenues responds to a marginal change in the resource stock. The term under 
consideration has positive sign which means that   i iS dSa
S dS
<   ( ).8A   
i.e. the original allowed resource stock share multiplied by the reverse elasticity is less 
than the marginal change share. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
From solution of the original value function we have the two value functions of the 
discounted revenues                              ( )
1
aa N
O O O
i i k
k
V S S S
a
ρ −−
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑               ( ).9A  
                                 ( )
1
aa N
N N N
i i k
k
V S S S
a
ρ −−
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑             ( ).10A  
Subtracting ( ).9A  from ( ).10A  to have incremental revenues, the positive change in 
firm’s i  revenues due to reallocation is 
     
( ) ( )
1 1
1
1
1
a aa aN N
N O N N O O
i i i i k i k
k k
aN
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aa k ON
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−
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=
−
=
=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜Δ = − = − =⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎜⎟ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
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∑ ∑
∑
∑
∑
 
The latter expression simplifies denoting by 1
1
1
N
N
k
k
N
O
k
k
S
S
σ =
=
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= − ⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
the percentage 
decrement into the total resource stock and with 1
N
i
i O
i
S
S
σ = −  the percentage change 
into firm’s i  resource stock. In order to have an increment into firms’ i  discounted 
revenues it suffices to hold the condition ( ) 11
1
a
i
σ σ
−− > − .  
